Iran's Proxy Network Adds Regional Fronts as Hezbollah and Houthis Press Gulf

Axis of Resistance enters the war

The Soufan Center reported in April 2026 that Iran had tapped its Axis of Resistance for reinforcement as the war expanded beyond its borders. Hezbollah launched missiles and drones against northern Israel on March 2, dragging Lebanon into the conflict on Iran's side despite the Lebanese government's declaration that the group's actions were illegal. In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias claimed drone attacks on US troops at Baghdad airport and a base in Erbil.

Yemen's Houthis formally joined Iran's war effort with missile salvos against Israel, though early launches were intercepted and largely symbolic. The Soufan Center assessed that the Houthis were best positioned among Iran's allies to add strategic weight by threatening the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the southern entrance to the Red Sea through which nearly twelve percent of global maritime trade passed before the Gaza conflict.

Dual chokepoint threat

A Houthi closure of Bab el-Mandeb, if achieved, would add significant pressure on global energy markets alongside the effective closure of Hormuz. During the eighteen months following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Houthi strikes on more than a hundred vessels forced more than sixty percent of commercial shipping to divert from the Red Sea. Red Sea traffic had partially recovered after a May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire but remained below pre-October 7 levels.

The Soufan Center noted in March that a Houthi entry into the Iran war would amplify Tehran's core asymmetric strategy: restricting shipping through Hormuz while attacking energy facilities in Gulf Arab states. Yemen expert Nadwa Al-Dawsari of the Middle East Institute told journalists she expected the Houthis would intervene at some point, and that the longer the war continued, the more likely their entry became.

Houthi escalation on the Red Sea coast

By August 2026, the Soufan Center reported that Yemen was moving closer to full-scale war, with escalating clashes between the Iran-backed Houthis and forces of the ousted Yemeni government. The Houthis concentrated drone and artillery fire on a major base in Mokha to prevent anti-Houthi forces from assembling, recognising that the Red Sea coastline from Bab el-Mandeb through Hodeidah was of paramount strategic importance.

Houthi Deputy Information Minister Mohammed Mansour told Al-Monitor that closing Bab el-Mandeb was a Yemeni option that could be implemented if aggression against Iran and Lebanon escalated or if any Gulf state became directly involved in military operations supporting the United States or Israel. Saudi Arabia has mobilised militarily but has not yet committed to a ground campaign against Houthi territory.

Limits of air power alone

Both the US campaign against the Houthis — Operation Rough Rider, which struck a thousand targets — and Operation Epic Fury against Iran demonstrate the limits of using air power alone to end threats to global commerce. The Soufan Center argued that the Houthis face risks in major escalation, including another US air campaign and potential ground combat with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but uncertainty about resupply from a strapped Tehran has not prevented incremental escalation.

For policymakers, the proxy network transforms a bilateral US-Iran conflict into a multi-front regional war. Depleting Israeli and US air defence supplies and offensive munitions across several theatres is precisely the attrition strategy Iran's axis was designed to execute — even as the death of Khamenei and the loss of Syria as a land corridor have weakened the network's long-term capacity to reconstitute.